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NOTES
MINNESOTA'S HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR CHILD VICTIMS
OF SEXUAL ABUSE
There are rarely any witnesses to an act of sexual abuse of a child, other than
the perpetrator and the victim. If and when charges are filed, the victim and
his or her family are often so traumatized by the investigation and by court
appearances that the case does not proceed to trial. In order to address these
problems, the Minnesota Legislature in 1984 enacted Minnesota Statutes sec-
tion 595.02, subdivision 3, which allows for the admissibility of some out-of-
court statements made by child victims of sexual abuse. This new exception to
the hearsay rule raises serious constitutional concerns, however. In this Note,
the author argues that section 595.02 furthers the underlying policies of the
existing exceptions to the hearsay rule and does not violate a defendant's con-
stitutional right to confront his accusers.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, reported cases of child sexual abuse' have
1. Child sexual abuse can be defined as "contacts or interactions between a
1
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risen dramatically within the last few years.2 These cases are difficult
to prosecute, for several reasons. The victim and the abuser are
often the only witnesses to the alleged incident of abuse.3 Moreover,
child and an adult when the child is being used as an object of gratification for adult
sexual needs or desires." SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED READINGS 1 (1980),
cited in B. MOROSCO, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF SEX CRIMES § 9.02[] & n.3
(1984). Child sexual abuse is recognized as a major social problem in the United
States. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the prevention of "sexual
exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing
importance." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
2. A national study of state child-protection statistics tallies reported sexual
abuse cases at a high of 22,918 in 1982, the most recent year for which statistics have
been assembled. Finkelhor, How Widespread is Child Sexual Abuse?, CHILDREN TODAY,
July-Aug. 1984, at 19. The American Humane Association's national study indicated
a 200% increase in state-wide reporting of child sexual abuse since 1976. Collins,
Studies Find Sexual Abuse of Children is Widespread, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1982, at C1, col.
1, CIO, col. 2.
These statistics do not reflect the true incidence of child sexual abuse since it is
the most underreported type of child abuse. See NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER
FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: LEGAL ISSUES AND Ap-
PROACHES 2 (rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE]. The National
Center on Child Abuse and Neglect estimates the true incidence of child sexual abuse
at over 100,000 cases per year. NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: INCEST, ASSAULT AND SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 2 (U.S. Dept. of
Health & Human Services 1981), cited in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra, at 23 n.5. One
commentator estimates that the actual incidence of sexual abuse of children is two to
50 times higher than the approximately 100,000 cases reported nationally each year,
largely because of the trauma of trial and pre-trial procedures. See de Francis, Protect-
ing the Child Victim of Sex Crimes Committed by Adults, 35 FED. PROBATION 15, 17 (Sept.
1971).
Locally, the increase is also dramatic. In 1982, Hennepin County reported 274
confirmed cases of child sexual abuse. In 1983, this figure increased to 317 cases. In
the first nine months of 1984, there were 319 confirmed cases. These cases now
account for 25% of the total number of cases referred for counseling or psychologi-
cal treatment. Telephone interview with James Christiansen, Hennepin County
Community Services Dept., Child Protection Division (Jan. 16, 1985).
Ramsey County officials report a similar increase in the reported cases of child
sexual abuse. The number of child sexual abuse incidents in Ramsey County in pre-
vious years is illustrated in the following table:





In 1983, the county reported 590 confirmed cases of child sexual abuse. RAMSEY
COUNTY OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, CHILD ABUSE REPORT - 1983, (Apr.
16, 1984). In 1984, there were 790 such cases reported. These figures demonstrate
a 30% increase from 1983 to 1984. Telephone interview with Terry Lindeke, Ram-
sey County Community Human Services (Jan. 17, 1985); see also Watson, Hidden Epi-
demic, Newsweek, May 14, 1984, at 30-36.
3. See NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTECTION,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD SEX-
[Vol. I11
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when a child victim participates as a witness4 in the abuser's criminal
prosecution, she and her family are further traumatized by investiga-
tion, repeated interrogation, and court appearances. 5 This trauma
to the complainants may be so great that the state will drop the
charges.6 If the case proceeds to trial, the child may find the court-
UAL ABUSE CASES 30 (. Bulkley reporter 1982) [hereinafter cited as INTRAFAMILY
CHILD SEX ABUSE CASES]; see also B. MOROSCO, supra note 1, § 9.02[2], at 9-5.
4. The equal treatment of child and adult witnesses contrasts with the deferen-
tial treatment which society provides to children in other areas of the criminal justice
system. Some commentators suggest that the constitutional protection of juvenile
offenders is inadequate. See, e.g., Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for
the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141 (1984); Note, A RecommendationforluvenileJury
Trials in Minnesota, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 587, 588 (1984). Nevertheless, the ju-
venile court rules represent society's recognition that adults and children should be
treated differently within the court system. While juvenile offenders are treated in a
different manner than adult offenders, a child victim is not.
There is also disparate treatment of defendants and victims. The victim has
none of the protections to shield her through the ordeal of the criminal trial that are
guaranteed to the defendant. Even though the court proceedings may traumatize the
witness more than the actual event, the witness enjoys neither the right to counsel
nor the right to remain silent. Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protec-
tor or Perpetrator? 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643, 644 (1982) (citing State v. Mohr, 99
N.J.L. 124, 129-30, 122 A. 837, 839 (1923) (witness does not have the right to con-
sult with counsel during testimony)).
5. See Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice
System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 984 (1969):
Psychiatrists have identified components of the legal proceedings that are
capable of putting a child victim under prolonged mental stress and endan-
gering his emotional equilibrium: repeated interrogations and cross-exami-
nation; facing the accused again; the official atmosphere in court; the
acquittal of the accused for want of corroborating evidence to the child's
trustworthy testimony; and the conviction of a molester who is the child's
parent or relative.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Stevens & Berliner, Special Techniques for Child Witnesses,
in THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 246, 248 (L. Schultz ed. 1980) (effects of
criminal proceedings on a sexually molested child can be more emotionally traumatic
than the assault itself).
The sexually victimized child can suffer severe trauma as a result of his or
her experiences in the judicial system. The experience or even anticipation
of testifying can be agonizing. Sometimes the child is also coerced by family
members not to testify or to recant earlier statements. In one known case, a
child was examined and cross-examined for over fourteen hours, thereafter
requiring psychiatric hospitalization. . . . [One child] attempted suicide
shortly after receiving a subpoena to appear in criminal court.
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 2, at 4-5. One commentator asserts that courts have
not been sensitive to the victimization that a child may face in the courtroom. As a
result, courts have become perpetrators, not protectors, of children's interests.
Parker, supra note 4, at 643; see also I. SLOAN, PROTECTION OF ABUSED VICTIMS: STATE
LAws & DECISIONS 54-55 (1982) (criminal jurisdiction is directed at deterring the
defendant rather than ensuring the child's protection); Avery, The Child Abuse Wit-
ness: Potential for Secondary Victimization, 7 CRIM. JUST. J. 1, 3-4 (1983).
6. See F. RUsH, THE BEST KEPr SECRET: SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN (1980).
Rush reports on the following study conducted in Massachusetts:
19851
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room proceedings so intimidating that she will not be credible as a
witness.
This problem has necessitated a reexamination of the hearsay rule
as it is applied to out-of-court statements of sexually abused chil-
dren. The hearsay rule is intended to preclude the admission of un-
trustworthy testimony by generally barring the admission of out-of-
court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
7
Because child victims are usually the only witnesses to sexual abuse,
however, their out-of-court statements are often the most probative
evidence in the case. Statements made shortly after the abuse occurs
are often more reliable 8 and credible9 than later statements made in
court. Consequently, the purpose of the hearsay rule-to exclude
unreliable testimony-is often not furthered by its application to
child witnesses.
A recent legislative enactment, codified at Minnesota Statutes sec-
tion 595.02, subdivision 3, addresses this problem.10 The new stat-
In a study of 256 known cases of sexual abuse of children involving 250
offenders conducted by the Brooklyn Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Children, parents and family found the police process so trying and
frightening to the children that 76 cases were dropped, leaving 174 cases
eligible for prosecution. Once charges were officially made, the number of
interrogations and court appearances resulted in such trauma to the chil-
dren and their families that another 77 were so discouraged that they too
dropped the charges. This left 97 cases. Of this number, 39 offenders
either absconded, were acquitted or were left pending, leaving 58 to be
tried. Of this number, 49 pleaded guilty in order to take a lesser charge
such as assault rather than rape or incest; 4 were found guilty as charged,
and 5 were committed to mental institutions. Of the 53 found guilty (ex-
cluding the 5 sent to mental institutions), 30 escaped jail sentence by sus-
pension or fine, 18 were sentenced to jail from six months to a year, and 5
received indeterminate sentences.
Id. at 156-57 (citation omitted).
7. See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
8. Testifying in court may adversely affect a child's perception. See A.D.
YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 208-09 (1979); Stevens & Ber-
liner, supra note 5, at 254 (child's memory of details blurs quickly); see also infra notes
31-32 and accompanying text. Child victims, however, are usually the only witnesses
to sexual abuse. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Their out-of-court state-
ments therefore become the most probative evidence in the case.
9. Children are under constant stress at trial and subjected to long series of
questions, damaging their veracity. Stevens & Berliner, supra note 5, at 255. As a
result, juries tend to disbelieve young children. See State v. Berry, 101 Ariz. 310, 314,
419 P.2d 337, 341 (1966) (noting defense counsel's attempts to discredit a six-year-
old child's testimony by use of calendar dates). In fact, even courts, as the fact finder,
tend to disbelieve young children. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d
1295, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Brown v. United States, 152 F.2d 138, 139 (D.C. Cir.
1945).
10. Act of Apr. 26, 1984, ch. 588, § 4, 1984 Minn. Laws 1226, 1231 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3 (1985)). The new provision reads:
An out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of ten years alleg-
ing, explaining, denying, or describing any act of sexual contact or penetra-
[Vol. I11
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ute admits into evidence a child's out-of-court statement regarding
acts of sexual abuse if certain conditions are met. First, the court
must conduct a separate hearing, out of the jury's presence, to deter-
mine that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement pro-
vide sufficient indicia of reliability." Second, the child must either
testify at the proceeding or be unavailable to testify.12 If the child is
unavailable to testify, corroborative evidence of the sexual abuse
must be provided.13 Finally, the statute requires the prosecution to
give notice to the defense of its intent to offer a statement into evi-
dence through the statute.' 4
Section 595.02 opens the door for the admission of videotaped
interviews, depositions, and testimony by child victims of sexual
abuse. These procedures, which are designed to protect the child
from the trauma of testifying in open court, also involve the admis-
sion of hearsay. Such videotaped hearsay statements will be admissi-
ble if they meet the reliability and unavailability requirements of
section 595.02.15
This Article submits that section 595.02 successfully meets the
special needs of the child victim without compromising general hear-
say rules nor the defendant's constitutional right to confront his ac-
cusers. Part I reviews the hearsay rule and the underlying bases for
its many exceptions and concludes that, while statements of child vic-
tims are often admissible under other hearsay exceptions, the new
statute provides uniformity in application and clearer judicial guide-
lines for admission. Part II addresses the issue of the statute's con-
stitutionality, and concludes that the statute meets the standards
established by the United States Supreme Court for compliance with
tion performed with or on the child by another, not otherwise admissible by
statute or rule of evidence, is admissible in evidence if:
(a) the court or person authorized to receive evidence finds, in a hear-
ing conducted outside of the presence of the jury, that the time, content,
and circumstances of the statement and the reliability of the person to whom
the statement is made provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(b) the child either:
(i) testifies at the proceedings; or
(ii) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the
act; and
(c) the proponent of the statement notifies the adverse party of his in-
tention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement suffi-
ciently in advance of the proceeding at which he intends to offer the
statement into evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity
to prepare to meet the statement.
Id.; see also id. § 260.156 (admitting out-of-court statements of child abuse victims in
dependency or neglect proceedings).
11. Id. § 595.02, subd. 3(a).
12. Id. § 595.02, subd. 3(b).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
1985]
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the confrontation clause. The author argues that the definition of
unavailability should extend to children who are incompetent or psy-
chologically unable to testify, and that a finding of incompetency to
testify at trial should not necessarily preclude a finding that an earlier
out-of-court statement was reliable if the child was competent at the
time of the statement. Part III discusses the statute's impact on vide-
otaping the testimony of child witnesses.
I. THE HEARSAY RULE
A. The Common Law Rule and Exceptions
Hearsay is defined in the rules of evidence as "[a] statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hear-
ing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted."16 Restricting the admissibility of hearsay statements
promotes accuracy and reliability17 by subjecting the witness to
cross-examinationt8 and allowing the factfinder to observe the wit-
ness's demeanor. 19
The hearsay rule has never been a complete bar to the admission
16. FED. R. EVID. 801; MINN. R. EVID. 801. Commentators suggest that the defi-
nitions of hearsay are either assertion-oriented or declarant-oriented. See Note, Mc-
Cormick on Evidence and the Concept of Hearsay: A Critical Analysis Followed by Suggestions to
Law Teachers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 423, 424 (1981). An assertion-oriented definition fo-
cuses on whether an out-of-court assertion will be used to prove the truth of what it
asserts. In contrast, a declarant-oriented definition focuses on whether the use of the
utterance will require reliance on the credibility of the out-of-court declarant. Id.
Compare FED. R. EVID. 801 with E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 246 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. McCormick's defi-
nition relies on both the assertion- and declarant-oriented definitions. See id. Under
either definition, however, statements not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted are not hearsay even though made in an out-of-court statement. See, e.g.,
State v. Hesse, 281 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. 1979) (evidence admitted by testimony of
another for corroborative purposes is not hearsay). Likewise, out-of-court state-
ments being offered for notice, impeachment, or to prove knowledge are not hearsay
statements. MINN. R. EvID. 801 committee comment.
17. See G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 159 (1978); see also
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158-59 (1970); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 800[01], at 800-09 (1982) [hereinafter cited as J. WEIN-
STEIN]. The presence of the witness in court under oath solemnifies the occasion; the
jury can observe the witness, and the defendant can cross-examine. These three con-
ditions in combination lead to an expectation that the witness will tell the truth. Ab-
sent these three conditions, testimony may be unreliable "because faults in the
perception, memory, and narration of the declarant will not be exposed." Id. at 800-
11.
18. See 5J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1367 (Chadbourn
rev. ed. 1974); 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 800-09 (1982).
19. See MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 245, at 727.
[Vol. I11
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of out-of-court statements, however.20 At common law, courts
found that the very nature of certain situations often guaranteed the
trustworthiness of out-of-court statements.2 1 Courts therefore de-
veloped classes22 of hearsay exceptions delineating those specific sit-
uations.23 Two fundamental considerations underlie most of the
exceptions to the hearsay rule: first, a circumstantial probability of
the statement's trustworthiness and second, a demonstrated neces-
sity for its admission into evidence.24
The trustworthiness principle is based upon the premise that many
out-of-court statements are so inherently reliable that there is no
need for cross-examination to reveal flaws and inconsistencies.25
Courts may infer a statement's trustworthiness when conditions sur-
rounding the statement provide a degree of trustworthiness equal to
that established by cross-examination.26 A statement's trustworthi-
ness depends in large part on the witness's trustworthiness, includ-
ing his or her ability to observe the event, the circumstances
surrounding the statement, and the declarant's relationship to the
case. 2 7
The second consideration underlying the exceptions to the hear-
20. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62 (the hearsay rule is "riddled with excep-
tions developed over three centuries").
21. 5J. WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 1422, at 253; Imwinkelried, The Scope of the
Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 239,
243-47 (1978). Even if reliable evidence did not meet the specific requirements of
any traditional exception, many jurisdictions recognize the judge's discretion to cre-
ate such exceptions. Id.; see FED. R. EvID. 803.
22. The class-exception system constitutes the general framework under which
hearsay statements are evaluated for their credibility. See Note, Residual Exception to
the Hearsay Rule, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 611, 613-15 (1979).
23. Exceptions to the hearsay rule vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as to
"number, nature, and detail." There are over 20 specified exceptions. Morgan &
Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 921 (1937),
cited in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980) (the hearsay exceptions are "an old-
fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists, futur-
ists, and surrealists").
24. See 5J. WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 1420, at 251-55; FED. R. EVID. 803 advi-
sory committee note; id. 804 advisory committee note.
25. See 5J. WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 1420, at 251 (in limited situations, reliabil-
ity can be assured without cross-examination of the original declarant); see MINN. R.
EVID. 803 committee comment-19 7 7 (the basis for the hearsay exceptions repre-
sents a judgment as to which statements are so trustworthy as to be admissible with-
out requiring the production of the declarant). A statement qualifying as an
exception to the hearsay rule must comply with other provisions of the Minnesota
Rules of Evidence before the statement will be admissible. The statement must be
relevant, admissible under Article 4, and based on personal knowledge. Id.
26. Comment, Sexual Abuse of Children- Washington's New Hearsay Exception, 58
WASH. L. REV. 813, 814 (1984) (reliability of statements considered sufficient substi-
tute for cross-examination).
27. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 17, 800[01], at 800-11 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
1985]
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say rule-the statement's necessity-is most often demonstrated by
the declarant's unavailability or a showing that the statements are of
unique evidentiary value.28 Mere necessity alone, however, without
some indicia of trustworthiness to substitute for cross-examination,
will not suffice to create an exception to the hearsay rule.2
9
B. The Common Law Rule and Statements of Sexually Abused Children
Out-of-court statements of child victims of sexual abuse will fall
within the underlying requirements of the hearsay exceptions in
most cases. First, a child's initial out-of-court statement is often
more trustworthy than later in-court testimony for several reasons. 30
Children forget facts and particular details more quickly than
adults.31 The time of the trial may be so remote from the offense
that accurate testimony will be difficult, if not impossible, to elicit at
trial.52 A child may find the courtroom setting so intimidating that
she will be unable to respond to questions.33 If the perpetrator is a
relative or close family friend,34 the victim may be coerced or forced
to change her story between the time of the initial statement and the
28. 5J. WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 1420, at 253.
29. Id. at 251; see Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968); Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
42-50 (1972). But see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (demonstration of unavail-
ability not required to meet the necessity requirement of the hearsay exception);
State v. Burns, 332 N.W.2d 757 (Wis. 1983) (unavailability requirements not limited
to geographical or physical unavailability but also encompass psychological trauma).
30. While the initial out-of-court statements may be more trustworthy than later
in-court statements, some courts and commentators question whether statements by
children can be reliable at all, because of the tendency of children to fantasize and
tell stories. See Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse
Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1751 (1983); cf B. MoRosco, supra note 1, § 9.01, at
9-1 to 9-2 ("inherent in the [child sexual abuse] statutes is a reluctance to accept the
validity of a victimized child's testimony in court"). Current psychiatric thought re-
jects the notion that children fabricate instances of sexual abuse. CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE, supra note 2, at 16 & nn.32-33. It is highly unlikely that children persist in
lying to authority figures about sexual abuse or that they even have the knowledge
about sexual matters to conjure up believable tales. Note, supra, at 1751.
31. A.D. YARMEY, supra note 8, at 204-05.
32. See Note, supra note 30, at 1750 & n.50 (1983) (citingJoint Hearings SB 4461
before the Washington State Senate Judiciary Comm. and Washington State House Ethics, Law
and Justice Comm., 47th Leg., 1982 Sess. 23 (Jan. 28, 1982)).
33. See Flammang, Interviewing Child Victims of Sex Offenders, in THE SEXUAL VIC-
TIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 175, 183 (L. Schultz ed. 1980) (leading questions in the court-
room are permissible, but leading questions in the police interview increase chances
of inaccuracy in child's statement); cf. State v. Fader, 358 N.W.2d 42, 46 (Minn. .1984)
(in case involving admissibility of five-year-old victim's statement, defendant ap-
pealed on the grounds that prosecutors committed misconduct by coaching the
victims).
34. Three out of four times, the offender is a family member or known to the
family. Parker, supra note 4, at 646 & n.22; Watson, supra note 2, at 31.
[Vol. I11
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trial.35
Second, a need for the child's testimony arises in child sexual
abuse cases, particularly when the abuser is a relative or close family
friend.3 6 The abuser may have had the opportunity to get the child
alone and apart from other potential witnesses.37 The child's state-
ments will then constitute the only proof of the crime.3 8 In addition
to the lack of witnesses, there may be no physical evidence of the
sexual abuse.3 9 This absence of physical evidence may be because
the abuse consists of activities other than penetration.40 Even if pen-
etration occurs, there may be no apparent physical damage because
the victim may not report the abuse until long after physical signs of
the abuse have disappeared.41
C. The Existing Hearsay Exceptions as Applied to Statements of Sexually
Abused Children
1. The Excited Utterance Exception
With the exception of the residual exceptions,42 Minnesota courts
most often cite the res gestae or excited utterance exception when
admitting statements of sexually abused children.43 Rule 803(3)
provides for the admission of hearsay statements, even if the declar-
ant is available, when the statement relates to "[a] startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excite-
ment caused by the event or condition."44
35. I. SLOAN, supra note 5, at 90. Sloan reports:
Child victims of sexual abuse are frequently influenced or pressured by
the perpetrator and other family members to recant their story. It is not
unlikely for the child to later deny the incident since the abuse probably
ceased as soon as court proceedings were initiated and he/she wants life to
go back to normal.
Id; see also CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 2, at 17.
36. See Note, supra note 30, at 1750.
37. See INTRAFAMILY CHILD SEX ABUSE CASES, supra note 3, at 30; B. MOROSCO,
supra note 1, § 9.02[2], at 9-5.
38. See Note, supra note 30, at 1749.
39. See CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 2, at 16.
40. B. SCHLESINGER, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: A RESOURCE GUIDE AND ANNO-
TATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 37 (1983) (less than 10% of all child victims are assaulted
through vaginal or anal penetration, so physical damage is minimal). For a discus-
sion of the various acts of the pedophile, see B. MOROSCO, supra note 1, § 9.02, at 9-3
to 9-5.
41. See CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 2, at 16.
42. See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., State v. Tumbull, 267 Minn. 428, 434, 127 N.W.2d 157, 162 (1964)
(child's conversation with mother admitted as part of res gestae exception); State v.
Gorman, 229 Minn. 524, 527, 40 N.W.2d 347, 349 (1949) (child's statement admitted
as part of res gestae even though child not competent to testify).
44. MINN. R. EVID. 803(2). Before codification of the Minnesota Rules of Evi-
dence, many statements were allowed into evidence under the res gestae exception to
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To determine spontaneity, many courts consider the length of
time between the occurrence and the statement.45 As the time lapse
between the occurrence and the statement increases, so does the
possibility for reflection and conscious fabrication.46 Consequently,
the requirement of excitement implies an additional requirement of
a timely revelation.47
The excited utterance exception has several disadvantages in child
sex abuse cases. Courts differ in construing the strictness of the
timely revelation requirement. 48 Courts that broadly construe the
requirement usually do so based on the understanding that children
may not immediately report an incident of sexual abuse because of
"threats, fear, guilt and other pressures to keep the incident a
secret." 49
Children's statements rarely meet a strictly construed timeliness
requirement because they generally do not make statements immedi-
ately after the abuse occurs. 50 The delay may be caused by the
the hearsay rule. Res gestae literally means "things" or "things happened." Black's
Law Dictionary defines res gestae as a "spontaneous declaration made by a person
immediately after an event and before the mind has an opportunity to conjure a false-
hood." BLAcK's LAw Dic-rioN~AY 1173 (5th ed. 1979). To be admissible under this
exception to the hearsay rule, the statement must be so closely connected to the
occurrence in both time and substance as to be part of the occurrence. Id.
45. See Gorman, 229 Minn. at 526, 40 N.W.2d at 348. In applying the spontaneity
exception to cases of child sexual abuse, many courts refuse to admit statements
made after any delay. See, e.g., Alston v. United States, 462 A.2d 1122 (D.C. 1983)
(four-year-old abuse victim's statements made to three government witnesses the
morning after the abuse had taken place were not admissible because the statement
lacked the spontaneity required by the excited utterance exception); State v. Slider,
38 Wash. App. 689, 695, 688 P.2d 538, 541 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (two-year-old
victim's statements were inadmissible under the excited utterance exception because
they were not made immediately after the abuse occurred).
46. See MINN. R. EvID. 803, committee comment-1977; see, e.g., Fader, 358
N.W.2d at 44-45 (five-year-old victim was competent to testify if capable of narrating
the facts truthfully; excited utterance was questionable because a "significant amount
of time" had elapsed and the statement was made in response to a question).
47. See MINN. R. EvID. 803, committee comment-1977, at 350.
48. Compare In Re Welfare of Chuesberg, 305 Minn. 543, 546, 233 N.W.2d 887,
889 (1975) (declaration by murder victim's three-year-old son was admissible even
though not made contemporaneously with victim's death) and State v. Creighton, 462
A.2d 980, 982 (R.I. 1983) (nine-year-old assault victim's statements to police 14
hours after incident within spontaneous utterance exception) with Leybourne v. Com-
monwealth, 282 S.E.2d 12, 14 (Va. 1981) (statement by a five-year-old victim of sex-
ual abuse four hours after incident was not spontaneous declaration).
49. Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions for a Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18J. MAR.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1984); see, e.g., Creighton, 462 A.2d at 982 (a less demanding time re-
quirement is necessary for the excited utterance exception to apply in sex abuse
cases, especially where the victim is a young child).
50. See Parker, supra note 4, at 651; see, e.g., Fader, 358 N.W.2d at 44-45 (question-
able whether statement was an excited utterance because a significant amount of time
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abuser's threats, 5 1 the child's confusion or fear,52 or reluctance to
hurt the abuser, particularly if the abuser is a relative or close
friend.53
Even if the child makes a timely statement, the statement may lack
the "excited" nature required for the spontaneous utterance excep-
tion. 54 For example, a child may not view an incident of fondling as
shocking.55 She may be too young to have assimilated adult
taboos.56 When a child has this perspective on a sexual experience,
she may not experience the shock or excitement that the law
presumes exists after such an event.5 7 The absence of shock or ex-
citement may render the statement inadmissible under the spontane-
ous utterance exception.
had elapsed before five-year-old child told the investigating officer that she had been
digitally penetrated).
51. See Burgess & Holmstrom, Sexual Trauma of Children and Adolescents: Pressure,
Sex, and Secrecy in THE SEXUAL Vic:TOMOLOGY OF YoUrH 72-73 (L. Schlutz ed. 1980).
52. Id. at 73; B. SCHLESINGER, supra note 40, at 55 (sexually abused child hesitates
to report a sexual assault out of fear she will be disbelieved or blamed for assault).
53. See Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 51, at 73 ("Children may fear that re-
vealing the secret will cause catastrophic results," such as abandonment or rejection);
see, e.g., Defiance, TIME, Jan. 23, 1984 (twelve-year-old girl jailed for contempt of court
after refusing to testify against father accused of sexually abusing her).
54. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10 (Iowa 1983) (five-year-old victim's
identification of person who sexually assaulted him inadmissible under the excited
utterance exception when police had shown the victim photographs and the victim
was not upset or excited at the time of the identification). For discussions of whether
questioning of the witness violates the excited utterance exception, see Fader, 358
N.W.2d at 44-45 (admission under the excited utterance exception questionable
when there was no evidence that the victim was excited, a significant amount of time
passed before the victim made the statement, and the statement was made in re-
sponse to a question); Gorman, 229 Minn. at 527, 40 N.W.2d at 349 (admissibility of
evidence unaffected when an answer or statement is made in response to a question).
55. D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 31 (1979); see Brown v.
United States, 152 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (three-year-old victim calmly reported
her assault as part of dinnertime conversation).
56. D. FINKELHOR, supra note 55, at 31, quoting A. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN
THE HUMAN FEMALE 121 (1953). ("What may seem like a horrible violation of social
taboos from an adult perspective need not be so to a child. A sexual experience with
an adult may be something unusual, vaguely unpleasant, even traumatic at the mo-
ment, but not a horror story"). This view is arguably outdated, and not widely ac-
cepted today. Early traumatic experience, mediated by a variety of environmental
factors can lead to maladaptive behaviours and distorted self-concepts. J. CONGER,
ADOLESCENCE AND YOUTH: PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD 534-
39 (1973). A child traumatized by a criminal trial will feel guilt, distortion, and denial
which frequently requires psychiatric treatment. Bauer, Preparation of the Sexually
Abused Child for Court Testimony, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & LAw 287-89 (1983).
57. See Note, supra note 30, at 1757. But see Peters, Child Rape: Defusing a Psycholog-
ical Time Bomb, HOSPITAL PHYSICIAN, Feb. 1973, at 46-59, cited in Parker, supra note 4,
at 650 & n.41 ("rape in a young child is almost always an emotional time bomb that
may explode later in life during courtship, marriage or child birth;" maladjustments
include frigidity, promiscuity, and prostitution).
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To mitigate the harshness of the exception, Minnesota courts have
construed the timeliness requirement so broadly that statements
made hours after the abuse occurred have been admitted as excited
utterances. 58 Such judicial torturing of the exception has resulted in
a great deal of uncertainty in its application.59
2. The Residual Exceptions
The underlying elements of trustworthiness and necessity are in-
corporated in the two residual hearsay exceptions found in the Min-
nesota Rules of Evidence. Rule 803(24) applies whether or not the
declarant is available;60 Rule 804(b)(5) applies only if the declarant is
unavailable.6 1 Under these exceptions, a court may admit evidence
which does not fall within any defined hearsay exception as long as
the evidence is sufficiently necessary and trustworthy.62
These residual hearsay exceptions6S provide that any statement
not covered by a defined hearsay exception may be admitted into
evidence if it meets the following criteria:
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and
(C) the general purposes of [the rules of evidence] and the inter-
ests ofjustice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence.64
Minnesota courts most often admit hearsay statements of sexually
58. See, e.g., Turnbull, 267 Minn. at 434, 127 N.W.2d at 162 (nine-year-old girl's
statement to mother regarding incident of abuse that occurred the previous day and
another incident that occurred shortly before the statement held admissible as part of
res gestae of crime); State v. Toth, 214 Minn. 150, 7 N.W.2d 325 (1943) (fact that
rape victim complained to her mother several hours after incident went only to credi-
bility of victim's testimony).
59. See Note, supra note 30, at 1759.
60. See MINN. R. EvID. 803(24); id. 803 committee comment-1977. Exceptions
to the hearsay rule are separated into two categories: exceptions which are not af-
fected by the declarant's availability are found in rule 803, and those exceptions
which require that the declarant be unavailable before the hearsay statement is ad-
missible are found in rule 804.
The Federal Rules of Evidence contain 24 exceptions to the hearsay rule which
may be invoked regardless of whether the declarant is available for cross-examina-
tion. See FED. R. EvID. 803. There are five additional exceptions found in the Federal
Rules that may be used only if the declarant is unavailable. See id. 804.
61. See MINN. R. EvID. 804(b)(5).
62. See FED. R. EvID. art. VIII, introductory note (1982) (purpose of residual ex-
ceptions is to encourage growth and development of hearsay exceptions while em-
bodying the principles underlying the hearsay rule).
63. See MINN. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
64. Id. 803(24), 804(b)(5). Both rules contain this identical language.
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abused children under the residual hearsay exceptions. 65 The main
advantage of these exceptions is their flexibility. The residual excep-
tions allow courts to go beyond the defined exceptions and look for
indicia of reliability more suitable to child witnesses.66 In State v.
Posten, 67 for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court held admissible,
under Rule 804(b)(5), a statement that the child victim made about
the defendant in a dream.
68
The residual exceptions, however, were intended for use only in
exceptional circumstances.6 9 They were never intended to be used
as exceptions for entire classes of hearsay statements, such as state-
ments by child victims of sexual abuse.70 The residual exceptions, by
their very nature, provide no clear guidance to the courts in consid-
ering the admissibility of this class of statements.
D. Advantages of Section 595.02
Section 595.02, unlike the excited utterance and residual excep-
tions, directly addresses the special characteristics of out-of-court
statements by child victims of sexual abuse. Unlike the excited utter-
ance exception, it allows courts to look beyond timeliness and an
excited state to other, equally pertinent indicia of reliability.
7 1
Courts are thus no longer required to stretch the requirements of
the excited utterance exception in order to admit such statements
into evidence when the statements are clearly reliable and
necessary. 72
Furthermore, unlike the residual exceptions, section 595.02 pro-
vides clear judicial guidelines for the admission of child statements.
The result is greater certainty and uniformity in admitting these
65. See, e.g., State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638, 641-42 (Minn. 1981) (child's sleep
talk admitted via residual exception to the hearsay rule where child obviously had
suffered); In re Welfare of T.D.S., 289 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Minn. 1980) (statement of a
child who did not testify, repeated by police officer at defendant's reference hearing,
admitted as sufficiently trustworthy); M.N.D. v. B.M.D., 356 N.W.2d 813, 818 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984) (child's statement sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under
residual exception).
66. See Note, supra note 30, at 1762.
67. 302 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1981).
68. Id. at 641.
69. See S. Rep. No. 93o1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7051, 7066 ("It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions
will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances").
70. Cf id. "The residual exceptions are not meant to authorize major judicial
revisions of the hearsay rule, including its present exceptions. Such major revisions
are best accomplished by legislative action." Id.
71. See Note, supra note 30, at 1762, 1765.
72. Comment, supra note 26, at 829; cf INTRAFAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES,
supra note 3, at 35 (courts in some cases have stretched timing between event and
utterance to a point where the statement cannot be truly considered spontaneous).
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statements.7 3
II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. The Ohio v. Roberts Test
The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him."74 Strictly construed, the sixth amendment pro-
hibits all hearsay statements from admission into evidence; 75 the
United States Supreme Court, however, has held that the framers did
not intend such an extreme result.76 While the Court has rejected a
strict construction of the sixth amendment, 7 7 it has provided only a
general approach for determining the validity of exceptions to the
hearsay rule, preferring a case-by-case approach.78 The Court's ap-
proach recognizes that a defendant may have a fair trial without the
physical presence of a witness and cross-examination of that wit-
ness. 79 Out-of-court statements may thus be admissible without vio-
lating a defendant's confrontation rights if the statements possess
the requisite trustworthiness.8 0
The United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts8l held that ad-
mission of an out-of-court statement does not deny an accused his
right to confrontation when two requirements are met. First, the
prosecution must demonstrate that the witness is unavailable after a
good faith effort to produce the witness.8 2 Second, the hearsay must
be marked with sufficient indicia of reliability to comport with the
73. The Minnesota statute provides criteria for determining whether the state-
ments are admissible as well as procedural rules which govern the operation of the
statute. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 1(f).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)
(applying the confrontation clause to the states through the fourteenth amendment).
75. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1980); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 243 (1895) ("If one were to read this language literally, it would require, on
objection, the exclusion of any statement made by a declarant not present at trial").
76. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
77. Id.
78. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970) (the Court does not map
out a theory of the confrontation clause which absolutely determines the validity of
all hearsay exceptions).
79. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 17, 800[04], at 800-20 (presence of witness
not always "insisted upon as indispensable").
80. The trier of fact must have a basis for evaluating the truth of statements of-
fered in evidence. Usually this is accomplished through cross-examination, which
exposes falsehood, brings out truth, tests recollection, and reveals the witnesses' de-
meanor. See I C.P. JoNEs, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM POLICE DETENTION TO FINAL
DISPOSITION 634-35 (1981).
81. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
82. Id. at 65.
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underlying policies of the hearsay exceptions.83 A statement's relia-
bility is presumed when it clearly falls within a defined or residual
exception to the hearsay rule.84 Statements not falling within these
exceptions may still be constitutionally admitted if accompanied by
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.85
The unavailability and trustworthiness requirements of the Roberts
test resemble the considerations of necessity and trustworthiness un-
derlying the exceptions to the hearsay rule.86 The two concepts,
however, are not coextensive.87 The hearsay rule functions indepen-
dently of the confrontation clause.88 Under earlier cases, the con-
frontation clause may have been little more than a constitutional
embodiment of the hearsay rule.89 Under more recent cases, how-
ever, the impact of the clause clearly extends beyond the confines of
the hearsay rule.90 A statement may be admissible under a hearsay
83. Id.
84. Id. at 66.
85. Id.; see also M.N.D. v. B.M.D., 356 N.W.2d at 817 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at
65).
86. Under Roberts, an out-of-court statement is admissible under the confronta-
tion clause if the declarant is unavailable for testimony and the statement has suffi-
cient indicia of truthfulness. Id. at 65. Under the residual exceptions, an out-of-court
statement is admissible if the statement is necessary and reliable. See MINN. R. EvID.
804(b)(5).
87. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976) (hearsay rule and
confrontation clause are not congruent). But see United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d
309 (2d Cir. 1977) (experience indicates that hearsay exception meets the require-
ments of the confrontation clause).
88. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee note. In the advisory committee's
interpretation, the hearsay clause and the confrontation clause function indepen-
dently, leading to different results in application. Consequently, the hearsay excep-
tions are stated as exclusions from the general hearsay rule. Whether or not to admit
the hearsay into evidence is up to the discretion of each judge. The discretionary
admissibility allows a judge to anticipate and avoid conflicts with the confrontation
clause. Id.
89. See, e.g., Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 327, 330 (1911) ("But [the con-
frontation clause] has always had certain well recognized exceptions. As examples
are cases where the notes of testimony of deceased witnesses, of which the accused
has had the right of cross-examination in a former trial, have been admitted"); Mat-
tox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (dying declaration admissible under
the confrontation clause); 5J. WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 1397 ("The rule sanctioned
by the Constitution is the hearsay rule as to cross-examination, with all the excep-
tions that may legitimately be found, developed or created therein").
90. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (the overlap of the hearsay doc-
trine and the confrontation clause is not complete); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415 (1965) (the right of cross-examination is part of the confrontation clause protec-
tion); United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982) (evidence of reliability
sufficient to satisfy the confrontation clause cannot be inferred from the hearsay ex-
ceptions); United States v. Carlson, 574 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1976) (hearsay excep-
tions and confrontation clause not congruent); Washington v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 201
(1984) (confrontation clause is more than a codification of common law or rules, and
1985]
15
et al.: Minnesota's Hearsay Exception for Child Victims of Sexual Abuse
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
exception but still be inadmissible because of the confrontation
clause. 9' Conversely, admission of evidence by misapplication of a
hearsay exception does not necessarily violate the confrontation
clause. 92
B. Constitutionality of Minnesota Statutes Section 595.02
The Minnesota statute appears carefully drafted to withstand con-
stitutional attack. Essentially, the legislation codifies the elements of
the Roberts test which, if met, indicate that admission of a hearsay
statement is constitutional.93
The statute requires that a witness be available or that there be
corroborative evidence if the witness is unavailable.94 In addition, it
requires a hearing outside the jury's presence to determine reliabil-
ity.95 The new statute thus demands the same degree of reliability
and witness unavailability required by the United States Supreme
Court.
In fact, the statute may provide stricter standards than required by
the sixth amendment. In addition to the Roberts requirements of un-
availability and reliability, the statute requires corroborative evi-
dence96 in situations in which the witness is unavailable. The
may be violated even though statements are admitted under recognized exceptions);
see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
I Pointer, the prosecution's use of former testimony given at a preliminary hear-
ing where petitioner was not represented by counsel was held to be a violation of the
confrontation clause. Id. at 406. The same result would be obtained from an applica-
tion of the hearsay rule. See FED. R. EvID. art. VIII advisory committee note. Nothing
in the Pointer opinion suggests any difference in essential outline between the hearsay
or the confrontation clause analysis. Id.
91. See Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1347; Barlow, 693 F.2d at 964 (the "circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" required by the hearsay rule are not equivalent to the
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" required by the confrontation clause;
therefore, evidence of reliability cannot be inferred under all hearsay exceptions).
92. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). Dutton has been interpreted by some
courts as imposing an "indicia of reliability" requirement in addition to the "circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness" required by the Rules. Mancusi v. Stubbs,
408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972); Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1347.
93. Compare MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3 with Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
94. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3(b).
95. Id., subd. 3(a). The determination of reliability may involve questioning the
child. The mode in which the judge questions the child is important. The questions
should be simple, direct, and easily answerable by an affirmative or negative re-
sponse. The judge should use language understandable by a child, tailoring ques-
tions to fit the age, sophistication, and personality of the child. The questioning
should also be conducted in a friendly manner to put the child at ease. I. SLOAN,
supra note 5, at 120-21.
96. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3(b). The two most effective types of corrob-
oration are eyewitness testimony and confessions or admissions. These types of cor-
roboration are rarely used in trial because the defendant will probably plea bargain
when faced with such persuasive evidence. I. SLOAN, supra note 5, at 107. For a dis-
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Supreme Court has not required independent corroboration under
the confrontation clause.97
1. Defining Unavailability Under Section 595.02: Mental Trauma and
Incompetency as Unavailability
In light of the peculiar vulnerability of child sexual abuse victims
as witnesses,9 8 the definition of unavailability should extend to chil-
dren who are incompetent to testify or psychologically unable to
testify. 99
In Minnesota, children are incompetent to testify if they are under
ten years of age and "lack capacity to remember or to relate truth-
fully facts respecting which they are examined."lOO A determination
of incompetency constitutes unavailability within the meaning of the
hearsay exceptions and the confrontation clause. 10 1
cussion of other types of corroborative evidence, including medical examinations,
behavioral indicators, prompt complaint, sexually abused child syndrome, and cor-
roboration of the perpetrator's identity, see id. at 107-13.
97. Particularly in cases of child sexual abuse, the corrobation requirement often
impedes prosecution of the abuser. In the District of Columbia, for example, 17% of
all child sexual abuse cases referred to prosecutors over a two-year period were not
filed because of lack of corroboration. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 2, at 16.
98. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
99. See INTRAFAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES, supra note 3, at 11-13; CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 2, at 13. But cf. Vasquez v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 376, 167
S.W.2d 1030, 1032 (1942) (mere nervousness does not justify denying accused his
right to face witness); Comment, supra note 26, at 813.
100. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 1(f).
101. Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050, 1055 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
980 (1984) (four-year-old rape victim, ruled incompetent to testify by the court, was
"clearly unavailable" and thus hearsay testimony regarding the rape incident was ad-
missible); Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo. 1984) (court ruled a four-year-
old sexual abuse victim, overcome by shyness and awe, an incompetent witness; her
testimony was not available to the prosecution and the hearsay statements of examin-
ing nurse and doctor were therefore admissible); Oregon v. Bounds, 694 P.2d 566,
568 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (in a case involving the sexual abuse of a four-year-old child,
incompetency to testify because of age constitutes witness unavailability).
This case law should be persuasive in Minnesota, since the unavailability rule
applied in these cases is virtually identical to the rule in Minnesota. In Minnesota,
unavailability is defined as follows:
'Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his
statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement;
or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death
or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has
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The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a witness may be un-
available to testify due to existing mental illness or infirmity.102 The
prosecutor, however, is constitutionally required to make a good
faith effort to procure the witness.O3 The question becomes
whether mental trauma to the child constitutes unavailability suffi-
cient to excuse the prosecutor from her duty to procure the witness.
Generally, a witness is unavailable for testimony if testifying would
exacerbate his or her mental illness or cause greater harm than that
experienced by the ordinary witness to a similar crime.104 Factors
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of
lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrong-
doing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the
witness from attending or testifying.
MINN. R. EvI. 804(a); FED. R. EvID. 804(a).
The Bounds court stated:
Although incompetency due to age is not expressly listed as a situation of
unavailability, we think that it qualifies. We noted that the opening phrase
'includes situations' indicates that the list in not intended to be exhaustive.
It is possible to read the language of subsection (d) concerning 'mental infir-
mity' as including incompetence due to youth, but we think that would do
violence to the literal meaning. In accord with the following state and fed-
eral case authorities, we hold that 'unavailability of a witness' includes the
situation in which a declarant is incompetent to testify because of age.
Bounds, 694 P.2d at 568 n.1 (citing State ex rel Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or. 163,
269 P.2d 491 (1954); Haggins, 715 F.2d at 1055; Ellison v. Sachs, 583 F. Supp. 1241
(D. Md. 1984)). But see Washington v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197 (Wash. 1984). In Ryan,
the defendant was convicted of indecent liberties with a four-year-old boy and a five-
year-old boy. Both parties stipulated that the boys were statutorily incompetent, ap-
parently based upon an incorrect interpretation of the competency statute. Id. at
200. The Washington Supreme Court held that "[s]tipulated incompetency based on
an erroneous understanding of statutory incompetency is too uncertain a basis to
find unavailability." Id. at 203. At first blush, Ryan may appear to be more applicable
than the majority cases listed above in cases dealing with section 595.02 because the
Ryan court was applying the Washington child abuse hearsay exception statute which
is identical to section 595.02. Strictly interpreted, however, the Ryan holding must
be limited to situations in which the child witness is mistakenly determined to be
incompetent. Consequently, Ryan carries no precedential value and very likely is not
even persuasive in its application to most cases brought under section 595.02.
102. FED. R. EvID. 804(a)(4). Courts have interpreted "physical or mental illness
or infirmity" to include psychological trauma. See, e.g., People v. Gomez, 26 Cal.
App. 3d 225, 228-30, 103 Cal. Rptr. 80, 82-83 (1972). In Gomez, a 15-year-old victim
of a sex crime testified at the defendant's preliminary hearing. At an evidentiary ad-
missibility hearing to determine whether her preliminary hearing testimony was ad-
missible as former testimony, two psychiatrists from the staff of the hospital at which
the child witness was presently committed testified that if she were forced to re-tes-
tify, she was likely to regress. In affirming the conviction, the court said that although
an illness must be severe to meet the unavailability requirement of the statute, tem-
porary illness may be sufficient infirmity.
103. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 (quoting Barber, 390 U.S. at 24-25).
104. See Warren v. tnited States, 436 A.2d 821, 829 (D.C. App. 1981) ("the grave
risks to the witness' psychological health justify excusing live in-court testimony").
(Vol. I11
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considered in determining unavailability due to mental trauma
include:
(1) the psychological history of the witness;
(2) the nature of the mental illness or infirmity at the time of
testifying;
(3) the probability of the act of testifying having an effect on the
witness's mental illness or infirmity;
(4) the degree and duration of infirmity anticipated as a result of
testifying; and
(5) the expected duration of the mental illness and whether the
court might continue the trial to accomodate the witness's
testimony.105
These factors may be interpreted and applied less strictly in deter-
mining the unavailability of child witnesses. Courts have been will-
ing to find young children unavailable within the meaning of the
federal rules of evidence because of the potential psychological
trauma of testifying.10 6
One commentator suggests that Roberts may not allow an otherwise
available child witness to be found unavailable to testify because of a
probability that the child will suffer psychological trauma if she testi-
fies.' 07 But Roberts does suggest that physical unavailability is not
always required.' 0 8 In light of the fact that section 595.02 was en-
acted to aid child victims of sexual abuse, a child's anxiety and psy-
chological health should be considered in determining unavailability.
105. See id. at 830 n.18. The trial court must balance the harm to the witness
against the fundamental principle that a witness is required to testify. See State v.
Bums, 112 Wis. 2d 131, 141-42, 332 N.W.2d 757, 763-64 (1983); cf. State v. Gilbert,
109 Wis. 2d 501, 512, 326 N.W.2d 744, 751-52 (1982).
106. See, e.g., Lancaster v. People, 615 P.2d 720, 723 (Colo. 1980) (three-year-old
child not required to testify in sex abuse case); State v. Boodry, 96 Ariz. 259, 265,
394 P.2d 196, 200, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 949 (1964) (court should not require five-
year-old child to relive the horrifying experience of being raped). But see Gilbert, 109
Wis. 2d at 516, 326 N.W.2d at 752 (potential psychological harm does not constitute
unavailability where other avenues of protection of child's psychological health, such
as videotaping testimony, can be used).
107. Skoler, supra note 49, at 17.
108. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7. Mr. Skoler responds to the argument that unavail-
ability is not always required by citing dictum in Roberts which states that in Dutton,
"the Court found the utility of trial confrontation so remote that it did not require
the prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness." Skoler, supra note 49, at
17 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7). Skoler concludes that the unavailability ex-
ception carved out by Dutton may not apply in child abuse cases when the child wit-
ness is the only witness against the defendant. Id.
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2. Meeting the Reliability Standard under Section 595.02
a. What Constitutes "Sufficient Indicia of Reliability"?
The second prong of the Roberts test requires the court to deter-
mine whether the out-of-court statements demonstrate sufficient in-
dicia of reliability.09 The statute, however, does not specifically
define what factors would constitute sufficient indicia of reliability. 110
Whether a child's out-of-court statement regarding sexual abuse
possesses sufficient indicia of reliability will depend upon the circum-
stances surrounding the statement. In determining whether a child's
statement concerning sexual abuse possesses sufficient circumstan-
tial guarantees of trustworthiness under the residual exceptions to
the hearsay rule, Minnesota courts have looked to time, content, and
other circumstances.", These other circumstances include the
child's truthfulness; the spontaneity of the statement; the consis-
tency, or lack thereof, of multiple statements by the same witness;
the child's competency; and any abnormal behavior tending to cor-
roborate the child's testimony. 1 2 Presumably, similar factors would
be used to determine reliability under the statute."l 3
The Washington Supreme Court, analyzing the constitutionality of
that state's almost identical child abuse hearsay statute, found the
following factors indicative of reliability:
(1) The statement contains no express assertion about just fact, (2)
cross-examination could not show the declarant's lack of knowl-
edge, (3) the possibility of the declarant's faulty recollection is re-
mote, and (4) the circumstances surrounding the statement [in that
case spontaneous and against interest] are such that there is no rea-
109. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
110. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3(a).
111. M.N.D. v. B.M.D., 356 N.W.2d at 818.
112. See id.
113. Accord Comment, supra note 26, at 827. In analyzing the Washington statute,
one commentator suggested the court explore the following factors to determine
reliability:
(1) the time lapse between the alleged sexual act and the child's recital
of the statement;
(2) whether the statement was made in response to a leading question;
(3) whether either the child or the hearsay witness has any bias against
the defendant or any motive for fabricating the statement or implicating the
accused;
(4) whether the statement was made while the child was still upset or in
pain because of the incident;
(5) whether the terminology of the statement was likely to have been
used by a child the age of the alleged victim; and
(6) whether any event that occurred between the time of the alleged act
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son to suppose the declarant misrepresented the defendants'
involvement. 114
b. Competency vs. Reliability
A determination of incompetency before trial should not necessar-
ily preclude the admission of an earlier out-of-court statement on the
grounds of unreliability. The concept of competency to testify at
trial is distinct from the concept of the reliability of a previous out-
of-court statement. The competency definition allows for the situa-
tion in which a child could be declared incompetent to testify at trial
yet have been competent to give a reliable statement at some prior
time. If a child is declared incompetent to testify by reason of her
lack of capacity to remember, the child may nevertheless have been
capable of receiving just impression of the facts or relating them
truthfully when giving the initial out-of-court statement." 5 This is
particularly true of children who have short memories and cannot
accurately remember events occurring months or years prior to the
competency hearing. In short, if a child was competent at the time of
the initial statement, her incompetency to testify at trial should not
preclude admission of the initial statement.
While Minnesota courts have yet to admit hearsay statements from
incompetent children under the new statute, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has allowed such statements into evidence under the excited
utterance exception. In State v. Gorman, 116 the court recognized that
an incompetent child's out-of-court statement, if reliable, is admissi-
ble in evidence. The court stated that this issue is so well settled that
it is not open to question.'1 7 Other courts have also held that an
incompetent child's out-of-court statement is admissible and consti-
tutional if sufficient indicia of reliability are present."r8
In short, the competency of the child does not automatically make
the statement inadmissible under the statute." 19 If sufficient indicia
114. Ryan, 691 P.2d. at 205 (citing Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89). In applying these
factors to the case before it, the Ryan court found the hearsay statements did not
demonstrate sufficient indicia of reliability. Id.
115. Cf Parker, supra note 4, at 702 & n.300 (noting instance where New York
district attorney advised attorney representing a sexually abused child to claim that
the child could not remember in order to avoid the trauma of testifying and to make
the pretrial hearing transcript admissible).
116. 229 Minn. 524, 40 N.W.2d 347 (1949).
117. Id. at 526, 40 N.W.2d at 348.
118. See, e.g., Lancaster v. People, 615 P.2d 720 (Colo. 1980) (sufficient indicia of
reliability to allow into evidence out-of-court statements by a child adjudged incom-
petent to testify).
119. See Note, Confronting Child Victims of Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of the Sexual
Abuse Hearsay Exception, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 387 (1984). This commentator
adds:
Some confusion still exists with respect to whether competency at the time
1985]
21
et al.: Minnesota's Hearsay Exception for Child Victims of Sexual Abuse
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
of reliability accompany the out-of-court statement, it should be ad-
missible. The child's incompetency therefore goes to the weight
rather than the admissibility of the evidence.l20
III. THE IMPACT OF SECTION 595.02 ON THE VIDEOTAPING OF
TESTIMONY OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE VICTIMS
The videotaping of interviews, depositions, and testimony of child
victims represents a recent development in the prosecution of child
sex abuse cases. A child victim's electronically recorded testimony
can be introduced into evidence in two ways. First, the child's inter-
view may be taped in a nonadversarial setting prior to trial. This
type of interview usually occurs between a police officer, prosecutor,
or other criminal justice officer, and the child. This procedure has an
added degree of reliability compared with admission through the tes-
timony of a third person. The facts are not colored by the testifying
individual's views but are presented precisely as the child presents
them. Videotaping in a nonadversarial setting is probably unconsti-
tutional, however, because there is no functional equivalent of cross-
examination. 121
The second procedure is a videotape in the adversarial setting.122
of the testimony, the event, or the declaration is determinative of admissibil-
ity of the hearsay. Commentators have observed, however, that 'with the
exception of res gestae utterances, all hearsay statements introduced under
any exception to the rule should be made by someone competent as a wit-
ness at the time the statement was made'
Id. at 397 (quoting Stafford, The Child as a Witness, 37 WASH. L. REV. 303 (1962)). The
validity of this argument is reduced somewhat by the dated authority relied upon by
the author. More recent case law indicates a trend to admit out-of-court statements
based on the reliability and necessity of the statement, rather than on the competency
determination. Cf Lancaster, 615 P.2d at 722-23 (trustworthiness of child's excited
utterance was determinative).
120. See supra note 101.
121. A bill currently under consideration in the Minnesota Senate would allow the
testimony of a complaining victim in a child abuse case to be communicated to the
courtroom "live" via closed circuit television. S.F. 847, 74th Minn. Leg., 1985 Sess.
401. This adversarial videotaping will be constitutional if it is conducted in a manner
that meets the Roberts test. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
122. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(3) (Supp. 1984). The Kentucky stat-
ute provides a similar procedure to videotape the testimony of a child allegedly the
victim of illegal sexual activity:
(3) The court may, on the motion of the attorney for any party, order that
the testimony of the child be taken in a room other than the courtroom and
be televised by closed circuit equipment in the courtroom to be viewed by
the court and the finder of fact in the proceeding. Only the attorneys for the
defendant and for the state, persons necessary to operate the equipment,
and any person whose presence would contribute to the welfare and well-
being of the child may be present in the room with the child during his
testimony. Only the attorneys may question the child. The persons operat-
ing the equipment shall be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen
or mirror that permits them to see and hear the child during his testimony,
[Vol. I11
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In this setting, the child's testimony is taken in a room other than the
courtroom, and televised through closed circuit equipment to the
court and jury. Attendance in the taping room is limited to attor-
neys, equipment operators, and persons necessary for the child's
moral support. This testimony may be broadcast simultaneously in
court, or it may be recorded and shown in court at a later time.12 3
The adversarial setting videotaping most closely meets the 595.02
and Roberts requirements. In fact, this method has two added indicia
of reliability compared with the traditional hearsay statement intro-
duced into evidence by a third person's testimony. As with the
nonadversarial setting, the facts are delivered directly by the child
and are not colored by the views of the individual recounting the
child's statement in court. In addition, the sixth amendment goals
are met by cross-examining and observing the demeanor of the wit-
ness, without direct confrontation. Videotaping allows the witness to
avoid the trauma of courtroom interrogation, the trauma of confron-
tation with the defendant, and parental influence or coercion.124
If the videotaped statement meets the unavailability and reliability
requirements of section 595.02, it is constitutionally admissible.125
These requirements are more easily met when the child victim is psy-
chologically unavailable to testify, and the taped interviews and de-
position procedures possess the substantial equivalence of cross-
but does not permit the child to see or hear them. The court shall permit
the defendant to observe and hear the testimony of the child in person, but
shall ensure that the child cannot hear or see the defendant.
Id.; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2312 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.17 (West
Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401 to 46-15-403 (1984); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-9-17 (1984); Act of Apr. 9, 1984, ch. 111, 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws 369; TEX. CODE
CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 38-071 (Vernon 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120
(West Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN: § 967.04 (West Supp. 1984).
123. Videotaping methods range from "formal deposition with full cross-exami-
nation in the physical presence of the defendant, to a videotaped interview in a play-
room between a child victim and a social worker." See Skoler, supra note 49, at 11.
Perhaps the earliest recommendation involving the use of a special child courtroom
to ensure a less intimidating environment was made by David Libai. See Libai, supra
note 5, at 1000 (1969).
124. See Parker, supra note 4, at 695.
125. For background on the use of videotape testimony, see Barber & Bates, Video-
tape in Criminal Proceedings, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1017, 1035 (1974); Brennan, Videotape-
The Michigan Experience, 24 HASTINGS LJ. 1 (1972); Crystal, Videotape Trials: Relief for
Our Congested Courts, 49 DENVER L.J. 463 (1973); Stewart, Videotape: Use in Demonstrative
Evidence, 21 DEF. L.J. 253 (1972); Comment, Videotape in the Courts: Its Use and Potential,
3 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 279 (1974); Note, Video-Tape Trials: A Practical Evalua-
tion and Legal Analysis, 26 STAN. L. REV. 619 (1974); Comment,Judicial Administration-
Technological Advances-Use of Videotape in the Courtroom and Stationhouse, 20 DE PAUL L.
REV. 924, 945 (1971). In addition, a videotape is generally admissible into evidence
at a criminal trial. See, e.g., United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221, 1228 (8th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1081 (1983).
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examination. 126 Assuming that the Roberts criterion of unavailability
can be met by demonstrating psychological unavailability, the Roberts
requirement of reliability is easily satisfied.127 Taped interviews and
depositions provide the substantial equivalence of cross-examina-
tion. 128 In addition, videotape is superior to a written transcript be-
cause it preserves demeanor evidence for the factfinder.' 2 9
The only aspect of confrontation not established by videotaped
testimony is that of direct physical confrontation. This requirement
is the least important of the factors comprising confrontation and
may well be outmoded. At the time the constitution was drafted, live
testimony was the only way that a jury could observe the demeanor
of a witness.130 The use of videotapes, however, does not represent
a substantial departure from direct physical confrontation since the
jury is provided with a view of the witness' demeanor.131 Courts dif-
fer on the value and necessity of direct physical confrontation. In
State v. Melendez, 132 the Arizona Appellate Court upheld the use of a
videotaped deposition of a seven-year-old sexual abuse victim, not-
ing that the defendant and his counsel were present during the vide-
otaping and had the right to cross-examine the witness.133 In
holding that no prejudice resulted to the defendant, the court stated
that "the circumstances justified the trial court's invocation of mod-
em technology to meet the special needs of a witness and to afford
the defendant his constitutional right to confrontation."l 3 4 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the other hand, has held that the
right to face-to-face confrontation is not met where the defendant is
excluded from the deposition of an adult.135 Nevertheless, most
courts hold that in child sexual abuse cases, a videotaped deposition
of the victim does not infringe on a defendant's sixth amendment
confrontation rights when the witness is psychologically unavailable
to testify at the trial. In Commonwealth v. Stasko, 136 the court approved
the constitutionality of videotapes, stating that the three purposes of
the right of confrontation (oath, cross-examination, and demeanor)
126. Skoler, supra note 49, at 18.
127. Id.
128. Parker, supra note 4, at 694-96 (discussing Commonwealth v. Stasko, 471 Pa.
347, 370 A.2d 350 (1977)).
129. The court pointed out in Stasko that a videotape preserves demeanor evi-
dence. 471 Pa. at 382, 370 A.2d at 355; see also People v. Ware, 78 Cal. App. 3d 822,
837-38, 144 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1978); Hutchins v. State, 286 So.2d 244, 246 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1973); People v. Winborne, 90 Misc.2d 71, 394 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1977).
130. Parker, supra note 4, at 695.
131. Id.
132. 135 Ariz. 390, 661 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1982).
133. Id. at 394, 661 P.2d at 657.
134. Id.
135. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979).
136. 471 Pa. 373, 370 A.2d 350 (1977).
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are well served by the videotaped deposition.137
The constitutionality of videotaping the statements or testimony of
child abuse victims is determined in the same way as statements in-
troduced by third persons in live in-court testimony. Thus, if the
videotaped statement meets the Roberts standard, it will arguably be
admissible under section 595.02 or another hearsay exception re-
gardless of the absence of an express statutory provision in Minne-
sota allowing its use.
CONCLUSION
While section 595.02 does not enlarge the scope of admissible
hearsay evidence, it does provide a cogent and constitutional method
of evaluating the admissibility of statements by child victims of sex-
ual abuse. With an express statutory provision for this type of hear-
say, courts can more uniformly protect the child victims of sexual
abuse while ensuring the constitutional rights of defendants.
137. Id. at 378-82, 370 A.2d at 353-55 (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 158).
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